A few days into the ongoing Iran war, some clarity about the situation and intentions has started to emerge, which can be summarized in five points:
- Iran was neither an imminent nor a substantial threat to Israel or the US. It was attacked because it is currently particularly weak.1
- Israel has a strategy: destabilising Iran, either definitively (by breaking the country up) or by repeated military campaigns and decapitation strikes (as witnessed in Lebanon). A regime change towards an Israel-friendly government would be welcomed, but is not counted on.
- The Iranian regime has a simple strategy: survival through escalation and prolongation of the war. It has little to no incentive to give in nor to negotiate, neither with the US nor with protesters.
- The US have absolutely no strategy. Trump will use an opportune moment to declare victory regardless of what is achieved. That could happen in a few days or a few months, depending mostly on his personal whims and interests. A large-scale war with ground operations seems highly unlikely.
- There is no substantial opposition organisation in Iran willing and able to effectively use force to take power. Decisive support from the US or Israel in building it is relatively unlikely.
A likely scenario
Based on these observations, I believe that the following scenario is – alas – the most likely:
- A war lasting a few weeks or months, followed by an inconclusive ceasefire,2 possibly with strengthened sanctions, an embargo and new strikes on all sides. Israel will remain the regional hegemon in the medium term.
- The economic situation in Iran will further deteriorate, which will not stop it from rebuilding its missile capabilities, while the nuclear programme will not be prioritised. Emigration from Iran will intensify.
- No regime change from below or outside is likely. Potentially, an internal conflict building on ethnic and religious groups, stoked by Israel and supported by the US, could start in border regions, although other regional actors will have little interest in it. Internal repression is more likely than not to further increase.
Consequences for Europe
To conclude, the war and its consequences will likely have substantial negative effects on Europe, in particular:
- Diversion of resources from Ukraine towards the Middle East, both in terms of troops and of interceptors.
- Increase in energy prices in the medium term in case of repeated interventions, leading both to a global economic downturn and to increased resources for Russia.
- Destabilisation of Lebanon (and possibly also Iraq and Syria) with new waves of refugees and migrants.
Given the high likelihood for negative consequences, it is surprising that the vast majority of EU member states has not urged for a swift end of hostilities more forcefully and some even signaled support for the war in spite of being well aware of its illegality and the cluelessness of the US.
- Of course, the war was illegal by any international law standard. The US or Israel did not bother to create a veneer of legality, as their contempt for international law is now notorious. Some of Iran's retaliatory strikes were violating international law (targeting countries not involved in the war) and international humanitarian law (involving civilian targets). ↩︎
- Potentially, a sort of agreement with a new generation of Iranian leadership could even be found, although that seems unlikely and it would probably only postpone further military escalation. ↩︎